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                                                Abstract       
This paper develops and simulates a simple two sector DSGE model for studying aggregate inflation 
and output dynamics under sectoral adjustment asymmetries. The CES aggregate consumption bundle 
consists of two different groups of goods with imperfect substitutability between as well as within 
the groups. Allowing for different within group CES aggregators implies that the degree of 
substitutability between goods in a group is group-specific. To generate sector-specific price rigidities 
the model assumes sector-specific Calvo pricing. The paper focuses on potential post-shock 
divergences across sectors as well as on the implications for aggregate inflation and output of the 
sectoral asymmetries and identifies an important role for the sectoral relative price for aggregate 
dynamics. More specifically, the paper generalizes Woodford (2003), which only allows for the price 
rigidity to differ across sectors. Incorporating sector-specific price elasticities is important and well 
in line with the micro-level evidence on individual as well as sectoral prices.  From the point of view 
of allocational efficiency and welfare, relative price movements occupy a central role in models 
incorporating Calvo pricing. This particular feature underscores the perceived macroeconomic 
benefits of low and stable inflation. This paper takes this logic a step further by incorporating 
movements both in individual and sectoral relative prices.   
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1 Introduction 
  
Relative price movements lie at the core of the market mechanism and the associated resource 
allocation. While conditions under which full price flexibility is efficient and welfare maximizing are 
well known, price rigidities of various forms are equally well known to have the potential of 
generating inefficiencies. Take for example the famous Calvo pricing mechanism that is incorporated 
in so many dynamic macroeconomic models of business cycle fluctuations to allow for pricing 
frictions. Calvo pricing generates relative price movements between firms currently optimizing their 
output price and those not optimizing. Hence, inefficient resource allocation due e.g. pure inflationary 
shocks can emerge in models incorporating the Calvo pricing mechanism. This potential for 
inefficiencies underscores the perceived macroeconomic benefits of low and stable inflation and 
justifies the appropriate policy intervention.   
Microeconomic data on individual prices clearly indicate that the distribution of the frequency of 
price changes in non-trivial. The range of frequencies is impressive: some of the prices, e.g. price of 
gasoline, behave like diffusions, while others, e.g. some of the services, change via infrequent, 
discrete jumps. Then again, price elasticities seem to differ across goods as well as across sectors. 
For example Anderson et al (1997)1 document that in the US estimated own price elasticity of demand 
ranges from 0.1 to 4.6. Examples of inelastic goods include salt, matches and physician services, 
while fresh tomatoes, fresh green peas and restaurant meals represent elastic goods. 
These observations on sectoral asymmetries are the starting point of this study. We seek to analyze 
the aggregate dynamics of an economy subject to different degree of sectoral price rigidity as well as 
subject to sector specific price elasticities. We will model these asymmetries by extending 
Woodford’s (2003)2 model of sectoral asymmetries to allow for the price elasticity of two groups of 
goods to differ from each other. As a byproduct we will derive a more general condition under which 
fluctuations in the sectoral relative price (around the frictionless benchmark) is of no consequence to 
the aggregate economy.  
After introducing the model and solving it, we run simulations in order to assess the quantitative 
importance to the aggregate economy of the fluctuations in the sectoral relative prices, when the 
economy is bombarded by various shocks. Of the various shocks we can think of, we will in particular 
derive the impulse responses to a cost push and interest rate shock. Given the New Keynesian 
structure of the model, a cost push shock – shock to inflation – is a standard one to consider, whereas 
a shock to the interest rate is particularly relevant from the point of view of monetary policy. 
As a byproduct of our analysis we are able to generalize the condition under which variations in the 
sectoral relative price do not affect aggregate inflation dynamics. Needless to say, identical frequency 
of price adjustment across sectors is not any more sufficient for aggregate inflation to be independent 
of the changes in the sectoral relative price. Sectoral price elasticity, or sector specific mark-up 
                                                          
1 Anderson P, McLellan R, Overton J and Wolfram G (1997), “Price Elasticity of Demand,” 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/alada/files/price_elasticity_of_demand_handout.pdf 
2 Section 2.5 “Consequences of Sectoral Asymmetries,” p. 200 in Interest and Prices: Foundation for a Theory of  
Monetary Policy (2003), OUP.   
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emerges as a factor that matters. More generally, the combination of the sector specific frequency of 
price adjustment and price elasticity basically determines how sensitive aggregate inflation is to 
changes in sectoral relative price and, hence, to shocks that affect sector specific price levels. 
The modelling framework in this study is an extended version of a dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) model with two sectors, nominal rigidities and imperfect competition presented 
in Woodford (2003). More specifically, we allow for the price elasticities to differ between the two 
sectors. This feature is important and well in line with the micro-level evidence on individual as well 
as sectoral prices. Moreover we allow for external habit formation (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999). 
Model simulations indicate that relative price movements3 can be important both from the policy 
transmission and welfare point of view. 
The rest of the study is organised as follows; the model used in the analysis is derived and presented 
in chapter 2. Chapter 3 presents the simulation and its principles while resulting graphs are shown in 
Appendixes. Chapter 4 concludes. 
 
2 A Two Sector Model 
 
The economy is composed of two sectors within which the goods are imperfectly substitutable. 
Hence, there is imperfect competition in the relevant markets. A representative household in this 
economy derives utility from a consumption bundle that is a CES aggregate of the sector specific 
consumption indices. These sector specific consumption indices are CES aggregates over a 
continuum of individual goods. Our representative household also works, thus generating disutility 
in the usual manner. The (flow) budget constraint determines the feasible choices for our 
representative household: on top of allocating income on consumption, the household can invest in 
one period bonds, which generates interest income. By working, the household earn wage income.   
We thus assume that the representative household seeks to maximise the following intertemporal 
utility 
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3 Sectoral asymmetries could lead to dual inflation; for examples, see e.g. Arratibel, Rodriguez-Palenzuela and 
Thimann (2002) and Estrada and Lopez-Salido (2002) and ECB (2003) for a more general discussion. 
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σ is the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in consumption and ψ the inverse of the 
Frisch elasticity. Ct is now an index of the household’s consumption of the goods that are supplied, 
while Lt  is the labor supply. Eq (2) contains also a general preference shocks φtB. The external habit 
formation is captured by the term h.   
 
Households maximise their objective function (1) subject to the (flow) budget constraint: 
        tttt CPBP  11)(  t
b
tttt BRLWP ,                                                                     (3) 
where Pt is the price level and Bt denotes bonds. 
Total nominal income consists of two components: labour income (PtWtLt) and the gross return on 
the bonds (Rtb Bt ). As the capital stock is assumed to be fixed in the considerations we do not include 
it here. This is because we will focus on the dynamic effects of cost push and interest rate shocks at 
the business cycle frequency. The underlying assumption here is that variations in the capital stock 
are not the main driver for business cycles. 
   
 
Consumption behavior 
The Euler condition for the optimal intertemporal allocation of consumption is derived from the 
maximization problem of the objective function (2) subject to budget constraint (3) with respect to 
consumption and (nominal) return on bonds Rt. This yields 
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where    )( 1tt
b
tt hCC is the usual consumption Euler equation describing the marginal utility 
of consumption. 
This leads to the optimal consumption dynamics of the log-linear form: 
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The hatted variables represent log deviations from the steady state. 
 
 
 
5 
 
2.1 Deriving a model for sectoral asymmetries 
The aggregate consumption index Ct is of the CES-form and consists of two sub-indexes 
for the commodity groups n1 and n2. 
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where φj,t  is a shock to the relative weight of the commodity group in a consumption basket 
and η is the elasticity of substitution between the groups and the sectoral consumption index 
aggregates a continuum of sector-specific goods  
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Here θj is the elasticity of substitution between sector j goods defining the own price 
elasticity of the demand for these goods. We allow the two θ:s to differ. 
Sectoral price indices, which defines the minimum cost of buying a unit of the sector j good, 
satisfy 
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whereas the aggregate price index corresponding to the aggregator in (6) is given by 
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Optimal allocation for different goods in sector j = 1, 2 can be derived from the minimization 
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Demand for different brands c(i) within a group j is then 
                                   .
)(
)( 1 jt
jt
jt
jjt C
P
ip
nic
j









                                                     (10)                                              
The sectoral market demand functions in equilibrium are then 
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Note that as in Woodford (2003) the aggregators have been normalized so that under the common 
individual price in both sectors, ,,)( ijpip tjt    
                                                 tjtjt Cic )( . 
Disutility of labour is given by ));(( jtihv  , where ξ is a vector of parameters of interest, so that 
sector-specific shocks to preferences regarding labour supply is allowed for, but not good-specific. 
Production of the good i is obtained via the production function 
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which thus implies that sector-specific shocks are allowed for. Assuming that each firm is a wage-
taker in the firm specific labour market, (nominal) profits of firm i in sector j can be written as 
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The real total cost of supplying any good i in sector j can be represented as 
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Note that we have used the assumption that the households are on their labour supply schedule so 
that the real wage equals the marginal rate of substitution between labour and consumption. Note 
also that mpl denotes marginal product of labour. 
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The desired mark-up in sector j is now 
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of output in sector j , njtY , is defined as the common level of sector j output under flexiple prices. It 
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with the intented interpretation that the utmost right hand side indicates the relative price Pjt / Pt 
required to induce the relative demand nt
n
jt YY / . The natural rate of aggregate output 
n
tY aggregates 
sectoral natural outputs according to the CES-aggregator. If 0~ t and φ =1 for all t and for both 
sectors, the flex price equilibrium involves a common output Y for all goods (satisfying the above 
equilibrium pricing equation) 
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Here ω denotes the elasticity of the real marginal cost function with respect to yjt (and 
n
jtY  i.e. the first argument of the marginal cost function). 
Assume Calvo-type (Calvo 1983) price staggering in each of the two sectors with αj the fraction of 
goods prices that remain constant in any given period in sector j. A firm i in that sector that is lucky 
to get the change to optimize its price in period t chooses its new price pt (i) to maximize the 
expected present value of its profits 
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The F.O.C for this programme is, after log-linearizing, given by                             
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marginal cost of the firms in sector j that last change their prices at date t. By (17) we have the 
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where jTsˆ  denotes the (deviation of the) average (i.e. real marginal cost corresponding to average 
sectoral output Yjt) real marginal cost in sector j. Sectoral price indexes are given in (8) and repeated 
here for convenience  
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so a log-linear approximation (around the steady state) allows us to derive the following 
relationship 
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Now, insert everything into the optimal pricing equation 
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We are almost there, as we still need to express the sector specific real marginal cost in terms of the 
relevant average sectoral output measure. From the expression for the demand for the sectoral 
composite good we obtain 
                                         jttjtjt pYY ˆˆˆˆ    
                                         njt
n
jt
n pYY
tjt
ˆˆˆˆ    .                                                           (24)   
 
 Substituting this into the average real marginal cost of sector j gives us 
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Inserting this into (23), we obtain 
              1,
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where      ntntttnRt YYp 12121 ˆˆˆˆˆ    and the sectoral relative price  ttP
P
Rtp 1
2lnˆ   is obtained from 
the aggregate price index as follows 
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and similarly for Rtt pnp ˆˆ 12  . Now define )(
1   jj  and since )1(121   n  and 
)1(212   n we can write 
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We still need to derive the dynamics for aggregate inflation. Note that 
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Hence, we can represent the sectoral inflation differential in terms of the lagged relative 
 price 1,ˆ tRp .           
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Aggregate inflation rate ttt nn 2211 ˆˆˆ    has a similar representation 
                          1ˆ)ˆˆ()ˆˆ(ˆ  tt
n
RtRt
n
ttt EppYY                                        (30) 
                            22112211 ,  nnnn  , 
where we can use equation (29) for the period t relative price to ascertain that aggregate inflation in 
general depends on the lagged relative price and not only on aggregate variables. Note also that 
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identical sectoral price adjustment frequency – α1 = α2 – is not anymore sufficient to eliminate the 
dependence of aggregate inflation on the sectoral relative price. On the other hand, if both the 
frequency of price adjustment and price elasticity of demand are equal across sectors, then we have 
                                      02211   nn  
so that aggregate inflation is independent of the sectoral relative price. 
 
 
2.2 The model block of sector-specific aggregated model for forecasting and policy analyse 
 
Here we briefly represent and collect the equations we utilise in the log-linearized model for 
simulations.  
Output is given by a linear production function (output consist of consumption goods only so that 
Y= C) 
,ttt LAY   
and then technical progress and productivity are catch by 
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t
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A
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The real marginal cost, in turn, are given by 
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The aggregate consumption Euler equation with external habit formation is 
b
ttt
b
ttttt Er
h
h
cE
h
c
h
h
c 









  ]ˆ[)1(
1
1
1
1 111
, 
and the sectoral market demand  
 


















t
j
jtj C
P
P
nc

log,

. 
Inflation dynamics is given by the New Keynesian Phillips curve 
pjttjt
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for aggregate and sectoral inflation.  
This formulation then focus on output gap role in inflation formation. If we instead would focus on 
the role played by the marginal costs we could utilise  
  tjptjttjtjjtj Epcm ,1,,,, ˆˆˆˆ     , j= 1, 2   
for sectoral and aggregate inflation and ζ is defined as earlier. The hatted variables represent log 
deviations from the steady state. We continue by focus on the output gap as we assume demeaning 
(of the data) would eliminate the natural level of output and productivity growth as 
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~
  etc. It is hence assumed that the labour supply equals labour 
demand i.e. the labour market equilibrium holds. Then we have the following linearized system of 
equations for the inflation adjustment  
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Endogenous variables are then aggregate and sectoral inflation π , πj , aggregate and sectoral 
consumption c , cj , relative prices  pR , market rate of interest rb , aggregate and sectoral labour effort 
l, lj (and the real wage as w=l).       
Moreover we have the following exogenous shocks variables that hit the economy: φj,p a general cost 
push shock and φr an interest rate shock to bond rate. These shock variables are assumed to follow an 
independent first-order autoregressive stochastic process.    
        apt
ap
t
apap
t u 1 ,   
        bpt
bp
t
bpbp
t u 1 ,   
        rt
r
t
rr
t u 1 .   
The interest rate shock affects the consumption decisions. Then the aggregate output gap is affected 
as we postulate that the aggregate level of inflation is fixed (inflation target) in the simulations so 
that dP = 0= PPadPa + PPbdPb .  
Here we do not made any assumptions about the covariance of the shocks.  
 
3. Simulation 
The linearized non-linear system of optimality conditions and structural equations has resulted in a 
system of linear stochastic difference equations under rational expectations, which can be written in 
state-space form  
A0 EtYt+1 = A1Yt + B0εt+1                                                                                                           (31) 
where A0, A1 and B0 are matrices of coefficients of the linearized model and Yt denotes a vector of all 
endogenous and εt a vector of all exogenous variables. These linearized equations form a dynamic 
system that determines the path of the variables of the model. This system contains backward and 
forward-looking elements. Depending on the parameterization of the model, either no stable rational 
expectations solution exists, or the model yields determinacy, i.e., the stable solution is unique. 
Indeterminacy, in turn, means that multiple stable solutions exist and the parameter space has to be 
restricted in order to focus on the case of interest. A solution for finding the rational expectations 
solution of the system is a feedback rule relating the current endogenous variables to the state 
variables of the model. This study utilises the method of eigenvector-eigenvalue decomposition, 
developed by Blanchard and Kahn (1980), where the stable and unstable variables of the system are 
decoupled and solved. The model is first partitioned into predetermined and non-predetermined    
variables and then a Jordan decomposition of the coefficient matrix is computed. Next the problem 
is transformed into decoupled stable and unstable equations. The model under scrutiny has a unique 
solution only if the Blanchard-Kahn condition for determinacy is met: the number of unstable 
eigenvectors (roots) must be exactly equal to the number of non-predetermined (forward looking) 
variables. Then this system has saddle path stability.  
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A model simulation is performed utilising Dynare toolbox for Octave. Calibrated parameter values 
(as priors) from earlier empirical studies e.g. Smets and Wouters (2003), Kilponen and Ripatti 
(2005), Gelain and Kulikov (2009) and Koskinen (2010). 
Parameters and the respective calibrated values in (sector-specific) simulation:  
-  β - discount factor (0.99) 
- α  - Calvo parameter (0.75) 
-  ω – elasticity of real marginal cost to y (in this case c) (1) 
-  ( λ growth rate) 
-  θa  price elasticity of demand within category a goods (-6) 
- θb  price elasticity of demand within category b goods (-15) 
-  η   the elast. of subst. between groups a and b,  
-       and price elast. of demand in consumption basket (-10) 
-  κ  weight of the output gap in infl.  
-       category a: 0.00225, category b: 0.009817 
-  γ  weight of the relative price index in infl. eq  
-      category a: 0.13488, category b: 0.0590 
-  σ intertemporal elasticity of substitution in cons (0.6) 
-   ψ the inverse of the elasticity of work effort w.r.t real wage (1) 
-   h habit formation parameter (0.47) 
-   n = 0.6 for category a 
-   uap stderr 0.02 
-   ubp stderr 0.01 
-   ur  stderr 0.005 
 
Sectoral price setting power and inflation adjustment 
The sectoral and aggregate inflation adjustment equations reveal that expectations concerning the 
future prices (based on pricing power) play a crucial role in determining the rate of inflation. The 
exact manner, how parameter θj the price elasticity of demand within a category j affect the sectoral 
inflation dynamics under Calvo-type pricing mechanism, is shown in in equations (18) – (19) in 
accordance with eq. (16). These equations together with eq. (21) relates pricing cycle together with 
pricing power of producers and it is obvious that as parameter θj determines the desired mark-up in 
sector j, the producers in that sector will optimize their prices (i.e. set p* as high as possible) 
accordingly. The magnitude (standard error) of a cost push shock in sector a and b is set according to 
the price mark-ups and difference in the price elasticity between these sectors. The fact that we have 
set an inflation target (dP = 0) by the central bank causes counter wise reactions of some variables to 
common shocks. 
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Cost Push and Interest Rate Shocks driving the dynamics of the Model 
 
The motivation of this study is to analyse the reactions of the endogenous model variables to structural 
shocks in a case where aggregated economy consists of two different kinds of commodity groups 
with diverge price elasticity of demand parameter values. The structural shocks of interest are a cost 
push and interest rate (real rate of return on bonds) shocks as they have a central role in 
macroeconomic fluctuations. In order to distinguish the differences between two separate sectors with 
different price elasticity of demand for their products we carried out the impulse response analysis in 
respect for that. 
The endogenous variables impulse response to (one standard deviation orthogonalized innovation to) 
an interest rate shock is plotted on pictures 1 to 2. These pictures plots the impulse responses (IRFs) 
in an model with two separate sectors (forming an aggregate economy). In a model for an aggregate 
economy the special features of IRFs of separate sectors are hidden (i.e. they are not identifiable) 
while these are clearly present in a model allowing for sectoral considerations (e.g. two sectors with 
asymmetries in the price setting behaviour and price elasticity of demand). More over an aggregate 
model could hide important counter wise reactions to shocks and the policy actions taken could treat 
the sub sectors of an economy unfairly. This is obvious when one look at the IRFs of consumption 
and labour in picture 1 and 2 to an interest rate shock as the sectors react with opposite effects but the 
aggregate consumption and labour in the same pictures give no information about that.  
The sectors response to a positive cost push shock is depicted in pictures 3 to 6. As mentioned 
previously, in sector a this cost push shock is twice as large in magnitude as in sector b. An interesting 
feature is the sectoral reactions of consumption / output and labour to this cost push shock as they are 
of opposite sign to both of the shocks i.e. to uap and ubp . Otherwise the reactions are as expected in 
this model specification. 
The variance decomposition methodology measures the relative importance of each structural shocks 
included in the model. The relative share of total variation that a particular shock explains for each 
endogenous variable in the model is presented in table 2 in appendixes. 
 
 
    
4. Conclusions 
 
In this study we have derived and simulated a two sector DSGE model in order to highlight the 
potential differences of these sectors with respect to shocks they face in an imperfect competition 
environment. The modelling framework in this study is an extended version of a DSGE model with 
two sectors, nominal rigidities and imperfect competition presented by Woodford (2003) in the sense 
that we allow for the sectoral price elasticities to differ between the two sectors. This feature is 
important and well in line with the microlevel evidence on individual as well as sectoral prices.  
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A typical economy consists of several kinds of markets for commodities (sectors) with possibly 
different structural features and dynamics that characterise the inter-temporal behaviour of agents and 
their preferences. As these differences between the sectors are due to the agent’s preferences (as well 
as technologies applied) the price setting behaviour within a sector could diverge markedly from the 
rest of the economy. Then the response of output, labour and inflation or price level formation to   
(cost push and interest rate) shocks could also be asymmetric within the sectors of economy. In these 
circumstances the outcome of any economic policy is not equal across the sectors and it is crucial to 
recognise and react to these differences. The simulations with calibrated parameter values 
demonstrate, that the relative price movements are potentially important from the policy transmission 
and welfare point of view as the investigated response of consumption, labour and price level 
formation to shocks are asymmetric within the two sectors of the simulated model´s economy. The 
consequences of the resulting tradeoff for optimal policies are left for further (empirical) studies in 
future. Expectations concerning the future prices are one important driving force beyond the 
dynamics of the model.  
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Appendix. 
 
Impulse responses 
 
 
Picture 1. Interest rate shock to inflation i:s, price level p:s and consumption c:s in sectoral model. 
 
Picture 2. Interest rate shock to r, labour effort ls and wage w. 
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Picture 3. A cost push shock in sector a to is, ps and cs. 
 
 
Picture 4. A cost push shock (upa) in sector a to ls and w. 
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Picture 5. A cost push shock (upb) in sector b to is, ps and cs. 
 
 
 
 
Picture 6. A cost push shock in sector b to ls and w. 
